Interview BG H.S. Hansell

We were anxious to uncover bottom turret guns and top turret guns in order to cover this forward hemisphere, so the units were shoved as far forward as we could get them and still fly a good tight formation. We then put these units together in a combat wing, trying to bring as much firepower to bear forward as we possibly could, getting some forward firepower out of these groups above and some top forward firepower from the top turrets below, to cover attacks on the center group. The Germans have met this by concentrating their attacks on the bottom group. We found that, coming into the target as soon as we open the bomb bay doors, we blanketed off the forward fire of the these bottom turret guns, not all of it, but enough so that it seriously interfered with the forward fire.

The Germans seemed to find that out, too. The lower flights are arranged so as to afford mutual protection to each other so far as possible; Any attack upon one flight is exposed to the fire from another. It is the best solution that we have, but we would be much happier if the bomb bay doors didn't open, for two reasons: First, that they interfere with the forward fire, and second, that the Germans timed their attacks by them. They would frequently fly along the formation alongside our units, making occasional sporadic attacks, until we reached the I.P. As soon as we got to the I.P., we opened the bomb bay doors, and that was the enemy signal to attack. The German fighters attacked with complete determination from then on, continuing their attacks as long as they had ammunition.

That was obviously the worst time for us. We had to settle down on the bomb run. Our groups had to separate to some extent, one group swung slightly out, the other group still further out to its uncovering echelon, coming into the target itself to leave room for successive bombing. We thus lost some of the mutual fire support that we had up to the I.P. and after it.

That forced us into group bombing. Initially we had tried bombing by individual airplanes, which is certainly ideal. We were forced into squadron formation and it later into group formations because the Germans were concentrating their attacks at that time and we could not afford to open up the formation and lose offensive firepower. We kept the groups together even through heavy anti-aircraft fire. Evasive action was taken with the entire group. Some evasive action of that kind is satisfactory. We avoided a good deal of the barrage fire, at any rate, by taking evasive action with the group, although obviously the degree of evasive action is somewhat restricted. But the fighter opposition was so much the worse of the two that we had to take the anti-aircraft fire and stay together.

The next step in development was to put these combat wings successfully together. We found, after some experiment, that there was a limit to the number of these units that we could actually fly in a single formation. We've had as many as 96 B-17’s in a single formation. That is tremendous. It stacks them in altitude to the point that there is a considerable wind differential between the low group and the top group. They will be spread over five or six thousand feet. With that much differential there isn't enough speed range in the airplane to permit it to stay in formation without having to weave out. That is the reason we gave up the five-group unit and stayed with the three-group unit. If we had odd numbers of airplanes, we had to make up another combat wing.

We had two standards of operation every day—a maximum effort and normal. It is very unusual to have anything normal. Almost everything was a maximum effort, and in order to fly the maximum effort force, we had to get into the air every airplane that we had listed on board as available. That generally wound up with each group having anywhere from 26 to 30 airplanes available. These groups initially had been very sadly depleted, lacking replacements, and they were not 35-airplane groups by any means, until quite recently. We didn't know what to do with the extra five or six airplanes that were available in each group until we hit upon the solution of making composite groups. I am sure that idea struck everyone with horror but it did work because of the extremely high degree of standardization that we insisted on in the formation—a high degree of standardization and operational procedure and information.

Add permitted us to take flight, squadrons, sometimes even individual airplanes from a number of groups, assign them to position in a composite group, and let them assemble together for the first time on the way out to the objective. In view of the fact that they are going to come into a lot of heavy opposition, that seemed like a very undesirable solution, but it was the best one we could find. It will work alright as long as the formation is carefully standardized and the operating procedure carefully observed.

We gradually developed operational procedure and standardization of tactics in the wing, put it down on paper as we went, and we have that a standard operating procedure and tactical document for the 1^st Wing which was the basis of all training and it is carefully and rigidly adhered to. It was fully intended to be changed frequently. Obviously, it would be wrong not to do that, but we did insist on rigid adherence to it in its current form. I hope it will serve as a basis of training here for the units that are going to that particular theater.

Last winter was a very critical period for this outfit. That looked for a while as though it might pass out of existence altogether. It dropped down to 52 percent strength. We had a very high turnover. We had one group that had 140% turnover. Most of the other groups didn't have more than 20 percent of their original personnel left. We had to approve the quality of gunnery, which was very poor, and is still poor. The fault lies not, I think with the equipment. I don't think we began to capitalize upon the quality of the equipment that we have. Our gunners were coming untrained. Many of them have never fired at altitude except to go up and clear the guns. All of our fighting was done at altitudes from 22,000 to 28,000 feet.

We have found that you can't scare these people off. You have to hit them. The German fighters are very determined, very skillful, and unless you actually knock them down, they will come in and make costly attacks. Consequently, we had to improve our gunnery. We started somewhat laboriously, got a gunnery range and started using B-17’s as tow target airplanes in order to practice gunnery at the altitude on which the fighting was being done.

The situation is improving but it is still extremely critical, and I don't know of any contribution that can be made here any more valuable than that of practical general training. We will winding up firing in flights, squadrons, and finally group formations at a single tow target. We sometimes hit the township but not very often. It was necessary because that was the kind of firing that had to be done if we were going to knock these fighters down.

As for the bombing, in spite of the fact that we had to go into formation bombing, the general quality of it picked up for a while. It had been very ragged before operating information. We were able to pick our best bombardiers and put them in the lead airplane and the deputy leaders ship, requiring everyone else to bomb on the leader, and the pattern was greatly improved. It would still be more desirable to go back to individual bombing if we could, but the cost is too high.

I would like to run through very briefly the nature of the development of a heavy bomb operation, a single one, as it is conducted now. The daily operation is decided upon at Bomber Command about 4:30 in the afternoon. It is absolutely dependent upon current weather. The weather in Europe changes very rapidly. They have as many changes of weather in England in a day as we have an entire United States. It pulls through quite rapidly. The area in which bombing seems to be most feasible is selected and, within that area, the principal targets are then selected. Targets are listed in accordance with a bomber directives from a plan, and they are listed by category. For a long time we were obligated to operate against separate pens because they were the first priority, and if weather permitted an attack on the submarine pen anywhere it had to be attacked. That priority has been changed now, but the general system is the same: check the weather, see where we can operate, if we can, and then select the highest priority target in that area.

That decision is generally made around five o’clock in the afternoon. They immediately notify the air division that there will be an operation, whether it will be maximum effort or normal, what kind of bombs, what kind of fuses, the approximate time, and the target. The target is given by code designation. They then get out a field order sometime later by teletype. The communications within the area have been established by the British and they have an excellent teletype system. They have the “scrambler” telephone, which doesn't extend everywhere, and they have had the ordinary public telephone.

The field order normally reaches us about 6:30 to 8:30 at night, depending on whether or not there is coordination necessary with fighter escort. If there is, it takes longer to get it out. On receipt of the order the division commander gets his staff together gets out his order, then generally involves completion of the route. Routes are generally given to a certain point and that is left to the air divisions to select the rest of it, the I.P., rally point, routes back and assembly. The I.P. is frequently the most difficult thing to select. It depends on the wind, which in the winter averages from 80 to 120 miles an hour at axis of attack. We prefer to bomb downwind; second choice is upwind. At that wind velocity, obviously we can't make much of a crosswind bombing approach at all. The direction of the sun is important too. At times the visibility is almost zero straight ahead into the sun. Normally, it runs from one and a half to three miles. The antiaircraft is very carefully analyzed. The location of the batteries is pretty well known. We draw the effective radius of action of the batteries’ fire. We measure about a dozen roots of approach, check the number of rounds that can be fired from each—and they are very considerable—so that the selection of the proper direction of approach is quite an important one. The selection of the I.P. involves a turn of 45° to 60° coming into the target. More than that tends to scatter the group as they peel off successfully. Less than that doesn't give them enough time to turn. By the way, the I.P. is a three-to four-minute run from the target. The route back should be over water, if possible, and get back on the deck.

The assembly of this number of units is an extremely complex problem and frequently causes a lot of trouble. We usually assemble on splasher beacons, which are tuned upon request. They are scattered throughout England, and broadcast on several frequencies simultaneously with identifying code numbers. You tried to pick up the division assembly lines between 2 splasher beacons so that assembly can be made over the overcast.

Three times out of five, assembly is made by the aid of these radio beacons, since visibility is often poor. We decide the time an altitude for the lead combat wing to pass 2 splasher beacons. The other combat wings are required to assemble with the combat wings on that line and echelon right or left.

The problem of identification of groups is not yet solved. When there are 6, 8, or ten groups milling around in a relatively small area trying to get in proper position, there can be very serious trouble if they pick up the wrong ones. Normally require radio silence so as to get as far as possible into the defenses before tipping our hand. We use visual signals for group identification.

In at least one case it had tragic results. The second time we went to Kiel the groups assembled on splasher beacons and were going to go out over the North Sea and then climb into Kiel. There was a mix up in the assembly with the result that the six groups sent out by the 1st wing, five of them were assembled in one unit and one was all by itself. It just happened that the identification signals that had been given out permitted that. It was very difficult to explain but we only had four combinations of colors and the chap who was in the wrong place kept getting the correct signal from the unit ahead of him. It wasn't really his fault that he wasn't in place but it resulted in one of the best one of our best groups going in by itself and to keel and just getting all shot up it also resulted, unfortunately, in the arrangement of the incendiary groups being in the wrong position, resulting in 4-pound incendiaries being dropped like a bunch of newspapers. When you turn them loose, they floated out in every direction. We had incendiaries coming up and over and through other airplanes, with considerable confusion. We think we have that assembly problem partially solved, but it is still a considerable problem—when you can't see the end of the runway, because of haze—to assemble 150 airplanes and get them into the right place without radio.

We tried using an Altis lamp with some success, putting it in the tail of the B-17 and in the nose. Combat wing commanders, after they get their order by teletype, prescribe the assembly of the three groups of their combat wing in areas which we have divided up for them, and the group commanders are supposed to give out the order for their own group assembly. On normal operations, we turn out about three squadrons and use the 4th in rotation to fill the other three. One squadron loses its identity on the mission. On the maximum effort, the other squadron goes to make up the composite group that is collected from the other groups.

On return from the mission, the units with wounded aboard either fire a flare or keep their flaps down after they have landed on which the signal for the ambulance to meet them. Immediately upon landing, the crews are collected by trucks and taken to the interrogation Center for the hot news quiz location of all aircraft that have gone down or location of enemy convoys. Then they get something to eat and are later interrogated in detail.

After the interrogation, each of the principal staff sections is advised to make up its component to the group of port for the group commander. The next morning the group commander has a meeting at which the group armament officer makes report on all of the armament—failure of gunnery as a whole. The group bombardier has analyzed the photographs which were taken of the bombing and states precisely the nature of that bombing. The navigator has a consolidated group log, and the communications officer has a report on radio problems. The engineering officer has a report on battle action.

The group commanders then go over the operation with the squadron leaders and come to air division headquarters at two in the afternoon for a complete rehash of the mission by the people who led it. The critique goes into detail. It is only then that we find out what really happened, because nobody returning from the mission knows what happened, since he had only a small part of it. As a result of this critique we try to change the things that need changing. If there is a new weapon being employed, something must be done to guard against it before the next mission to avoid heavy losses.

The opposition that has been developing through these operations has been a growing very fast and has reached a greater intensity than last year. However, it now seems to be tapering off of that level. So far we think we have enough equipment, enough tactics, and enough procedure to penetrate that opposition without excessive losses. The percentage of losses has gone down, of course, as the force has increased. We think the war is on a paying basis if it can just get enough force to drive it up through, capitalize on it, before something does happen.

The enemy has many new developments intended to stop our operations. One of the most unpleasant is the use of rockets. Rockets constitute a real hazard. Another is the bombing from enemy fighters, although it hasn't been very successful. They have been dropping very large bombs from a considerable altitude above all formations, and we lost one or two airplanes from that cause. Another is heavy caliber cannon. On at least one occasion they have stood out of range of our effective fire from the rear quarter and knocked down four B-17’s from the rear group. That was done with 37-mm or 40-mm cannon on an FW.

The Germans are making desperate attempts to find effective tactics against our bombers. So far as we know they haven't got a solution now that will stop our offensive, provided it is pushed as vigorously and rapidly as possible. If we wait too long, sooner or later the Germans will find something that is going to make our operations too expensive. We are satisfied with the equipment as it is now in the face of present opposition. We must improve our training, but that can be done. We are satisfied with the results that can be achieved. Most of us in the lower echelons are completely satisfied with the quality of the leadership from above in the air war.

I think the general attitude of the boys who are doing the job over there is pretty well brought out by a small incident in one of these wing commander’s meetings. The operation at Kiel was not successful to the extent that we wanted it to be. The bombing of the first group was poor, and the first group had been doing very fine bombing. We called on the group later to describe what the group had gone through. The captain stood up and said “I am sorry, the group leader is still in the hospital. I will tell you what I know about it. We left the I.P. and started into Kiel, open the bomb bay doors. The fighters came in and almost immediately they hit our ship pretty hard. The airplane commander, who was also the group commander, was hit in the neck by a shell. The navigator was killed. The AFCE was knocked out of the bombsight and one engine was knocked out. There was considerable confusion. It took a few minutes to get the pilot off the controls and get ourselves back together. We couldn't use the AFCE, so we had to bomb manually. The bombardier was giving instructions and the bombing wasn't as good as it should have been because the PD indicator that was on the opposite side of the cockpit and I couldn't see across the cockpit on account of the smoke.”

The airplane was on fire. It had about as many things wrong with it as it could have and still go on. But that particular outfit was concerned with getting its job done and did do a reasonably good job despite all of these things. I think that is typical.

There have been several instances that I know of which crews have lost an engine and gone on into the target and not drop their bombs until they had a chance to make a good bombing approach. I think that shows a very high degree of determination. If you drop out of formation, you are completely out of luck in this theater, because the fighters always pick on the cripple.

There have been a number of illustrations of the very fine morale and spirit of the combat units themselves. There was a time last winter when we didn't get any replacements for four months and the unit dropped down to about 50 per cent of its strength. Every time that two or three would get around a cup of coffee, they would start drawing graphs and they would all come out with the same answer. It showed that if the same rate was going to continue sometime in April or May there wasn't going to be anyone left. And that during that time I never heard any indications from anybody that they ought to go to night bombing or that we ought to wait until we had some more help. I think we can all be very proud of the crew members, gunners, radio operators, navigators and the rest of the boys who are taking it on the chin and certainly not having any bands play for them while it is being done.

The strength of the force was increasing rapidly in the last month or two. It had been pretty low for a while. The aircraft losses stayed about the same. The actual number of aircraft lost permission didn't increase much, but our strength did, so our losses per mission were going down considerably. The chance of getting back were very much better.

Weather was a critical factor. As the weather got worse, our bombing got poorer. Oddly enough, there didn't seem to be very much relationship between the antiaircraft encounters and the accuracy of bombing. I think that is because these bombardiers just created their teeth, looked down through the bombsight, and paid no attention to the flak that was bursting around them.

Q: you mentioned these rockets in long range firing—about two ways to approach it. One is to build heavy turrets with heavy guns 37-mm or 40-mm, or to build and furnish accompanying fighters. What do you figure the answer to be?

A: I think the answer in order of desirability is: fighters first, guns second. There was never any question in the minds of any combat crew member here but what he would like to have accompanying fighters. Nobody was standing on his pride and saying we could get along without them, because it meant all the difference in the world. When the fighters were along, the mission was going to be a relatively easy. When they weren't along, it was tough.

Q: Do you think we are on the right track by giving high priority to long range escort fighters?

A: Yes, I definitely do.

Q: you mentioned something about changing this formation. With nose turrets on all your bombers, what did you visualize the formation will be, so that we can start the second Air Force on that?

A: I think it will stay as it is. This one is designed to give forward fire. The forward fire will be better with the turret. We had a flexible twin-50 in there anyway with not as much field of fire, but the same general kind of fire, and this formation was satisfactory for that. I think it will also be satisfactory for the turret because the high angles of deflection and the turret are going to be relatively unprofitable. It is the small angular deflection and the forward tone that will pay the most dividends, I think. I recommend sticking to this formation.

Q: You wouldn't bring your wingman up in the lead formation, then bring your two wing ships up a little forward so that you have a 90° azimuth to the turret, so that you can get more supporting power of the lead airplane?

A: No sir, I wouldn't go quite that far. Desperation can be closed a little. We try to fly a little closer than that, as a matter of fact, push forward just a little.

I'd like to point out something about that formation. I have never seen a decent picture of it. It looks like a huddle of airplanes flying around. This doesn't look like any kind of formation. And yet, if you stand directly underneath it and it is flowing perfectly it looks nice. The rest of the time it looks rotten, and almost every picture that comes out of it convinces everyone that the people don't know how to fly a formation.